We determine how an individual can use life insurance to meet a bequest goal. We assume that the individual's consumption is met by an income, such as a pension, life annuity, or Social Security. Then, we consider the wealth that the individual wants to devote towards heirs (separate from any wealth related to the afore-mentioned income) and find the optimal strategy for buying life insurance to maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest goal. We consider life insurance purchased by a single premium, with and without cash value available. We also consider irreversible and reversible life insurance purchased by a continuously paid premium; one can view the latter as (instantaneous) term life insurance.
Introduction
Life insurance helps in estate planning, specifically, in providing bequests for children, grandchildren, or charitable organizations. With this purpose in mind, we determine how an individual can use life insurance to meet a bequest goal. We assume that the individual's consumption is met by an income, such as a pension, life annuity, or Social Security. Then, we consider the wealth that the individual wants to devote towards heirs (separate from any wealth related to the afore-mentioned income) and find the optimal strategy for buying life insurance to maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest goal.
In this paper, we join two hitherto unconnected streams of literature. The first stream is that of optimal purchasing of life insurance, and most of the articles in this area maximize utility of consumption, bequest, or both. The seminal article in this area is Richard (1975) ; please see Bayraktar and Young (2013) for some recent references relevant to the problem of maximizing utility of household consumption by using life insurance.
The second stream is that of maximizing the probability of reaching a particular target. This problem has been studied in probability problems related to gambling, as in the text Dubins and Savage (1965, 1976) . For an important extension of the work of Dubins and Savage see Pestien and Sudderth (1985) , in which they control a diffusion process to reach a target before ruining. For related papers see Sudderth and Weerasinghe (1989) , Kulldorff (1993) , and Browne (1997 Browne ( , 1999a Browne ( , 1999b . Instead of controlling a diffusion, we maximize the probability of reaching a particular goal and allow the individual to purchase life insurance to help reach that goal, while adding a random deadline (namely, death).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we consider the case for which the individual buys whole life insurance via a single premium with no cash value available, while in Section 2.2, she can surrender any or all of her whole life insurance for a cash value. In both cases, we compute her expected wealth at death because her goal is to reach a given bequest, so expected wealth at death is relevant. Section 3 parallels Section 2 for the case in which insurance is purchased via a continuouslypaid premium; however, we reverse the order of the topics as compared with the order in Section 2.
In Section 3.1, the individual is allowed to change the amount of her insurance at any time; in our time-homogeneous setting, this amounts to instantaneous term life insurance. By contrast, in Section 3.2, we do not allow the individual to terminate life insurance, so for the remainder of her life, she has to pay for any life insurance she buys. The solution of the problem in Section 3.1 is simpler than and informs the solution to the problem in Section 3.2, so we present the simpler problem first. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Single-Premium Life Insurance
We begin this section by stating the optimization problem that the individual faces. In Section 2.1, we consider the case for which the individual buys whole life insurance via a single premium with no cash value available, so she never surrenders her life insurance policy; she may only buy more. In Section 2.2, we incorporate a non-zero cash value and find the optimal insurance purchasing and surrendering policies in that case. At the end of each of Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we compute her expected wealth at death.
No cash value available
We assume that the individual has an investment account that she uses to reach a given bequest goal b. This account is separate from the money that she uses to cover her living expenses. The individual may invest in a riskless asset interest earning at the continuous rate r > 0, which actuaries call the force of interest, or she may purchase whole life insurance.
Denote the future lifetime random variable of the individual by τ d . We assume that τ d follows an exponential distribution with mean 1 λ . (In other words, the individual is subject to a constant force of mortality, or hazard rate, λ.) The individual buys life insurance that pays at time τ d . This insurance acts as a means for achieving the bequest motive. In this time-homogeneous model, we assume that a dollar death benefit payable at time τ d costs H at any time. Write the single premium as follows:
in which θ ≥ 0 is the proportional risk loading. Assume that θ is small enough so that H < 1; otherwise, if H ≥ 1, then the buyer would not pay a dollar or more for one dollar of death benefit.
In this section and in Section 2.2, we suppose that the premium is payable at the moment of the contract; as stated above, H is the single premium per dollar of death benefit. In Section 3, we consider the case for which the insurance premium is payable continuously. Let W t denote the wealth in this separate investment account at time t ≥ 0. Let D t denote the amount of death benefit payable at time τ d purchased at or before time t ≥ 0. Thus, with single-premium life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics
(2.2)
An insurance purchasing strategy D = {D t } t≥0 is admissible if (i) D is a non-negative, nondecreasing process, and (ii) if wealth under this process is non-negative for all t ≥ 0. We include the latter condition to prevent the individual from borrowing against her life insurance.
Remark 2.1. By requiring that D be non-decreasing over time, we effectively assume the individual cannot surrender any life insurance once she has bought it. In the real world, whole life insurance has a surrender value that the individual can withdraw, and in Section 2.2, we include that feature of whole life insurance.
We assume that the individual seeks to maximize the probability that W τ d ≥ b, by optimizing over admissible controls D. The corresponding value function is given by Thus, it remains only to determine the maximum probability of reaching the bequest on
We next present a verification lemma that states that a "nice" solution to a variational inequality associated with the maximization problem in (2.3) is the value function φ. Therefore, we can reduce our problem to one of solving a variational inequality. We state the verification lemma without proof because its proof is similar to others in the literature; see, for example, Young (2012a, 2012b) for related proofs in a financial market that includes a risky asset.
because when the wealth and life insurance benefit lie in the interior of R 1 , the individual does not purchase additional life insurance; rather, she continues with her current benefit and invests her wealth in the riskless asset. Indeed, φ D < H φ w means that the marginal benefit of buying more life insurance (φ D ) is less than the marginal cost of doing so (H φ w ). On the closure of that region in R, written cl(R 1 ), the following equation holds: rwφ w − λφ = 0.
To help us solve the variational inequality (2.4), we recall that in similar problems (for example, purchasing life annuities to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, as described in Milevsky et al. (2006) ), the optimal strategy is to "act" only at the safe level. In our case, that translates into buying life insurance only when wealth reaches H(b − D) so that φ solves the following boundary-value problem for 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b − D) and 0 ≤ D < b:
Buying life insurance only when wealth reaches H(b − D) is indeed optimal, as we prove in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. The maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal on
(2.6)
The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to purchase additional life insurance until wealth reaches the safe level H(b − D), at which time, it is optimal to buy additional life insurance of b − D.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that φ in (2.6) is increasing and differentiable with respect to both w and D on R. Because φ solves the boundary-value problem (2.5),
we have rwφ w − λφ = 0 on R. Next, we show that φ D − H φ w ≤ 0 on R:
We have, thus, shown that the expression for φ in (2.6) satisfies the variational inequality (2.4).
The continuation region equals
, D < b}; therefore, the optimal insurance purchasing strategy is to buy additional insurance of b − D when wealth reaches the safe level
Remark 2.2. We fully anticipate that the results of this section will hold when one considers other models, such as more general financial and mortality models, including those that are not time homogeneous. Specifically, we expect that when insurance is purchased by a single premium with no cash value available, then it will be optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level to buy additional life insurance.
Remark 2.3. Optimally controlled wealth is invested in the riskless asset until it reaches H(b − D); thus, wealth at time t, before reaching the safe level, equals W (t) = we rt , for a given initial wealth
. The time that wealth reaches the safe level, denoted by τ H(b−D) , is given by
The individual reaches her bequest motive if she dies after time τ H(b−D) ; this occurs with probability
, which equals the expression given in (2.6), as expected.
Because we are maximizing the probability that wealth at death equals b, it is of interest to determine the expected wealth at death.
for an individual who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 2.2 is given by
(2.7)
Proof. Expected wealth at death equals
; thus, from the discussion in Remark 2.3, we have
and the expressions in (2.7) follow. 
Because the expression in equation (2.7) solves this BVP, we confirm that it is the correct expression for
Cash value available
Standard nonforfeiture laws ensure that an individual who owns a whole life insurance policy can exchange the policy for its cash value. In this section, we incorporate that feature of whole life insurance into the model in Section 2.1. Therefore, we allow the process D to decrease, although it is still required to be non-negative. We assume that when the individual surrenders her death benefit, she receives a proportion of the purchase price. (If the cash value is determined according to some other method, such as a proportion of the reserve, then one can still express it as a proportion of the purchase price.) Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] be the proportional surrender charge, so that the individual receives (1 − ρ)H for each dollar of death benefit that she surrenders. The case in which ρ = 1 is equivalent to the case for which no cash value is available, as in Section 2.1.
Write φ s for the maximum probability of wealth at death reaching the bequest b when whole life insurance can be surrendered. (We use a superscript s to denote that insurance can be surrendered.)
The corresponding verification lemma is as follows.
Lemma 2.4. Let Φ s = Φ s (w, D) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differentiable with respect to both w and
satisfies the following variational inequality on R:
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, suppose
< 0} is the continuation region because when the wealth and life insurance benefit lie in the interior of R 1 , the individual does not purchase nor surrender life insurance; she continues with her current benefit. After Lemma 2.1, we discussed the inequality φ To find φ s , we hypothesize that the optimal purchasing strategy is identical to the one in Section 2.1. Specifically, the individual does not buy additional insurance until wealth reaches the safe level
. Furthermore, we hypothesize that it is optimal to surrender life insurance for wealth small enough, so that the individual liquidates her assets in order to take advantage of the riskless return. It turns out that this hypothesis is correct, and we prove this assertion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. The maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal on
(2.9)
The associated optimal life insurance surrendering and purchasing strategies are as follows:
, then surrender all life insurance. Thereafter, invest all wealth in the riskless asset until wealth reaches the safe level Hb, at which time, it is optimal to buy life insurance of b. Proof. We use Lemma 2.4 to prove this proposition. First, note that φ s in (2.9) is increasing, continuous, and piecewise differentiable with respect to both w and
In fact, this inequality holds strictly, except when D = 0, in which case the individual has no death benefit to surrender.
, the inequality holds with equality, while rw φ s w − λφ s < 0 for D = 0; thus, it is optimal to surrender all one's life insurance when wealth is less than
, the inequality holds strictly; thus, we deduce that it is not optimal to surrender any life insurance when
, the individual is indifferent between surrendering all her life insurance and surrendering none of it, as far as maximizing the probability that she will die with wealth equal to b. We assume that she surrenders none of her life insurance when w = (1 − ρ)H(b − D) because, for that wealth, expected wealth at death is greater when she does not surrender her life insurance; see Corollary 2.6 below.
Finally, observe that φ
, the inequality holds strictly; thus, we deduce that it is not optimal to buy additional life insurance until wealth reaches the safe level. We have, thus, shown that the expression for φ s in (2.9) satisfies the variational inequality (2.8).
Remark 2.5. We anticipate that the results of this section will hold when one considers other models, such as more general financial and mortality models, including those that are not time homogeneous.
Specifically, we expect that when insurance is purchased by a single premium with cash value available, then it will be optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level to buy additional life insurance, and it will be optimal to surrender life insurance when wealth is low enough.
As in Section 2.1, it is of interest to determine the expected wealth at death for someone who is allowed to surrender her life insurance in exchange for its cash value.
Corollary 2.6. Expected wealth at death,
for an individual who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing and surrendering strategies of Proposition 2.5 is given by the following if λ = r:
If λ = r, then expected wealth at death is given by
, it is optimal for the individual to surrender all her life insurance and thereafter invest her money in the riskless asset until wealth reaches the safe level Hb. Thus, for wealth in this range, Remark 2.6. Note that E s in (2.10) and (2.11) is not continuous at w
, which is due to the difference between the optimal surrendering strategy of the individual for wealth less than versus
thus, from the standpoint of expected wealth at death, it is better for the individual not to surrender her life insurance when w = (1 − ρ)H(b − D), even though the probability of reaching b is the same whether she surrenders all life insurance or surrenders none at that level of wealth.
Insurance Purchased by a Continuously Paid Premium
Section 3 parallels Section 2 for the case in which insurance is purchased via a continuously-paid premium; however, we reverse the order of the subsections. In Section 3.1, the individual is allowed to change the amount of her insurance at any time; in our time-homogeneous setting, this amounts to instantaneous term life insurance. By contrast, in Section 3.2, we do not allow the individual to terminate life insurance, so for the remainder of her life, she has to pay for any life insurance she buys.
The solution of the problem in Section 3.1 is simpler than and informs the solution to the problem in Section 3.2, so we present the simpler problem first.
Instantaneous term life
In this section, we assume that the individual buys life insurance via a premium paid continuously at the rate of h = (1 +θ)λ per dollar of insurance for someθ ≥ 0. Furthermore, we assume that the individual can change the amount of her insurance coverage at any time. The proportional loading covers expenses, profit, and risk margin; therefore, we assume that no reserve accumulates. Thus, the set up in this section is equivalent to the individual purchasing instantaneous term life insurance. With continuously paid premium for instantaneous term life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics
(3.1)
For this section, an admissible insurance strategy D = {D t } t≥0 is any non-negative process. We do not insist admissible strategies be such that W t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 with probability one because of the constant drain on wealth by the negative drift term −hD t . Therefore, we modify the definition of the maximized probability of reaching the bequest by effectively ending the game if wealth reaches 0 before the individual dies. Define τ 0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : W t ≤ 0}, and define the value function bȳ
in which we maximize over admissible strategies D. (We use a bar to denote that the premium is payable continuously, and we use a superscript t to indicate that the insurance is term life.) We refer toφ t as the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining. To motivate the verification lemma for this problem, we present the following informal discussion.
Because D is an instantaneous control, we anticipate thatφ t solves the following control equation: In (3.3), the indicator function equals 0 or 1, and corresponding to each of those values, we choose D to be a minimum because of the term −hDφ t w . Specifically, if the indicator equals 0, then the optimal insurance is D = 0; if it equals 1, then the optimal insurance is D = b−w. Thus, we can replace equation (3.3) with the equivalent expression: 
is positive on (0, 1] if and only if (c + 1)(1 − a) ≥ 0, which is true. Therefore, we have shown thatφ t in (3.7) satisfies the variational inequality (3.6). The optimal insurance strategy follows from the fact that φ t solves the control problem (3.3) with D ≡ 0.
Remark 3.1. When the force of mortality is less than or equal to the force of interest, the individual feels as if she has time to reach the safe level; therefore, it is optimal for the individual to invest in the riskless asset and wait until she reaches the safe level before she buys any life insurance. For initial wealth w, wealth at time t equals W (t) = we rt , and the time that wealth reaches the safe level equals
The probability of reaching the safe level before dying equals e −λτwt , which equalsφ t in (3.7), as expected.
Corollary 3.3. If λ ≤ r, then expected wealth at death,
for an individual who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.2 is given bȳ
(3.9)
Proof. From the discussion in Remark 3.1, expected wealth at death equals
and the expressions in (3.9) follow.
Remark 3.2. Note thatĒ t in (3.9) uniquely solves the following BVP on (0,w t ]:
Next, we consider the slightly more complicated case of λ > r and present a helpful lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose c and a are constants such that 0 < c < 1 < a. Then, the following three statements hold:
has a unique zero x * in the interior (0, 1). Furthermore, f 1 (x) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x * , and f 1 (x) ≥ 0
Proof. Proof of (a). Observe that f 1 (0) = f 1 (1) = 0. Also,
and note that f So, if we define g by
then to show that f ′ 1 has at most two zeros in (0, 1), it is enough to show that g ′ has one zero in (0, 1)
which has a unique zero at x = a−1 a−c ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we have proved that f 1 has a unique zero in (0, 1). Proof of (b). Observe that f 2 (0) = 0 and lim x→1 f 2 (x) = −∞. Also,
thus, f 2 increases on 0,
and decreases on a−1 a−c , 1 . To show that f 2 is non-negative on [0, x * ), it is, therefore, enough to show that f 2 (x * ) ≥ 0.
To this end, recall that (1 − x) c ≤ 1 − cx because the left side of this inequality is concave in x (so lies below its tangents) and the right side is the tangent of (1 − x) c at x = 0. From part (a), we know
which will follow if we show the stronger inequality
in which we use 1 − (x * ) a = (1 − x * ) c and cx * ≤ (x * ) a . Inequality (3.11) is equivalent to
which holds on [0, 1) because the left side decreases with respect to x * and equals 0 if x * = 1. Thus, we have proved that f 2 is non-negative on [0, x * ).
Proof of (c).
Observe that f 3 (0) = 1 and f 3 (1) = 0. Also,
thus, f 3 decreases on 0, is, therefore, enough to show that f 3 (x * ) ≤ 0. Inequality f 3 (x * ) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
which is equivalent to inequality (3.10) because (x * ) a = 1 − (1 − x * ) c . Thus, we have proved that f 3 is non-positive on [x * , 1].
Proposition 3.5. If λ > r, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is given byφ
12)
for initial wealth w ∈ [0,w t ]. Here, w * is the unique zero in (0,w t ) of the following expression:
(3.13)
The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is as follows: (a) If wealth w is less than w * , then purchase life insurance of b − w.
(b) If wealth is greater than or equal to w * , then do not purchase life insurance until wealth reaches the safe levelw t , at which time it is optimal to buy life insurance of b −w t = rb r+h . Proof. First, use Lemma 3.4(a) to prove that the expression in (3.13) has a unique zero in (0,w t ). To this end, let a = ; then, the expression in (3.13) becomes f 1 in Lemma 3.4(a). We know that f 1 has a unique zero x * in (0, 1); thus, w * = hbx * r+h is the unique zero of (3.13) in (0,w t ).
Next, note thatφ t is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differentiable on [0,w t ], with 14) and the inequality Remark 3.3. For wealth equal to w * , the probability that wealth at death equals b is the same whether the individual buys full insurance D(w) = b − w until wealth reaches 0 or whether she buys no insurance until wealth reaches the safe level. So, she is indifferent between these two strategies, and we picked the buy-no-insurance strategy because her expected wealth at death is greater under that strategy; see Corollary 3.6 below.
Remark 3.4. When λ > r and when initial wealth w ∈ [0, w * ), optimally controlled wealth at time t equals
which continually decreases and might reach zero before the individual dies. The time that wealth hits zero depends on w:
The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death (including death benefit) equal to b equals the probability that the individual dies before time τ 0 , or 1 − e −λτ 0 , which equalsφ t , as expected. When initial wealth w ∈ [w * ,w t ], then the individual invests all her wealth in the riskless asset, so that wealth at time t equals we rt , and she does not buy insurance until wealth reaches the safe levelw t = hb r+h .
Corollary 3.6. If λ > r, then expected wealth at death,Ē t (w) = E w (W τ d ), for an individual who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.4 is given bȳ
(3.20)
Proof. For 0 ≤ w < w * , wealth at death is either b or 0, so expected wealth at death equals bφ t (w).
From the discussion at the end of Remark 3. 
Next, we present properties that the dividing point w * possesses. In the interest of space, we omit the proof of this corollary but invite the interested reader to provide it.
Corollary 3.7. When λ > r, the dividing point w * between full insurance D(w) = b − w for w < w * and no insurance D(w) = 0 for w ≥ w * satisfies the following properties:
(a) w * increases proportionally with respect to b, the bequest goal.
(b) w * increases with respect to λ, the force of mortality.
(c) w * decreases with respect to r, the riskless rate of return. Thus, for h fixed, she is more likely to want to buy full insurance now instead of waiting to reach the safe level. However, the premium rate h increases with λ, so we have to consider how w * changes with h. The safe level increases with h, which makes the individual less willing to wait to reach the safe level. However, the premium becomes more expensive; thus, the individual's desire to buy full insurance is dampened. The net of these effects is to increase w * with λ; that is, the extra cost of the premium is not enough to fully eliminate the individual's greater willingness to buy full insurance now. (c) There are two re-enforcing effects of r on w * . First, the safe level hb r+h decreases with r, so the individual does not have to wait as long to reach the safe level. Second, if r increases, then the individual's money increases at a faster rate (namely, r) and reaches any level sooner. Thus, w * decreases with r because the individual is more willing to wait to reach the safe level.
(d)
We found examples that demonstrate that w * might decrease withθ or might increase withθ. There are two competing effects ofθ on w * as discussed in part (b) above: increasing the safe level versus increasing the premium. If the effect of increasing the premium is larger than that of increasing the safe level, then w * decreases withθ, and vice versa.
Remark 3.7. The following provides a summary of what we have learned in this section, as well as a clarification of some of the results. Suppose you decide to start buying full insurance at a wealth level w that is less than the safe level. This is a winning move if you die before time τ 0 , the time at which your wealth is depleted to zero; on the other hand, waiting to buy until after reaching the safe level is the winning move if you live to time τwt. Therefore, by letting p(t) = e −λt denote the probability of living to time t, the better strategy is to buy full insurance if 1
while the better strategy is to wait if the inequality goes the other way.
We see, therefore, that w * is precisely the wealth level that results in
We can see from this equation that any changes that cause both τ 0 and τwt to increase will decrease both probabilities and thereby increase w * , while changes that cause both times to decrease (such as an increase in r) will decrease w * . For changes that cause the two times to move in different directions, the effect can be uncertain, as we noticed above for an increase in h, which causes τwt to increase but τ 0 to decrease.
Irreversible whole life
In this section, once the individual buys a given amount of insurance D, then she must pay premium at the rate of hD for the remainder of her life. She cannot reverse this purchase. Wealth follows the process given in (3.1). Denote the maximum probability of dying with wealth at least b before ruining byφ; it is defined as in (3.2), except that the definition of admissible strategy differs in this case. Indeed, an insurance purchasing strategy D = {D t } t≥0 is admissible if D is a non-negative and non-decreasing process.
In the case for irreversible whole life insurance with premium payable continuously, the safe level differs depending on the existing amount of life insurance D. Indeed, for a given level of wealth w, the individual can safely invest it in the riskless asset and earn investment income at the rate of rw. Because the individual already has a death benefit of D, at the safe level, this income must be sufficient to cover the insurance premium; that is, rw ≥ hD, or equivalently, w ≥ hD r . Moreover, if D is less than rb r+h , then we have the safe level from Section 3.1, namely hb r+h . Thus, the safe level when life insurance is irreversible is given bȳ
(3.21)
The verification lemma forφ is as follows.
Lemma 3.8. LetΦ =Φ(w, D) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differentiable with respect to both w and D onR = {(w, D) : 0 ≤ w ≤w(D), D ≥ 0}. SupposeΦ satisfies the following variational inequality onR:
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, supposeΦ(w(D), D) = 1. Then, onR,
When D ≥ b, the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to buy any additional life insurance because D already meets the targeted bequest. The goal for the individual is not to ruin while paying the premium rate hD. Thus, in this case,φ solves the following BVP:
We give the solution to this BVP in the next proposition and prove that it satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8. The associated optimal insurance purchasing strategy is not to buy any additional insurance.
Proof. The functionφ given in equation (3.24) satisfies the BVP (3.23), and it is non-decreasing and continuously differentiable with respect to w and D. Therefore, to complete the proof of this proposition, we only need to show thatφ D ≤ 0. To that end, note that
As a final observation, becauseφ D is strictly negative for wealth less than hD r , it is not optimal to buy additional life insurance. 
which decreases over time. Thus, wealth will never reach the safe level, and the relevant hitting time is the hitting time of zero wealth, τ 0 , which equals
The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death equal to at least b is the probability that she dies before time τ 0 , or 1 − e −λτ 0 , which equals (3.24), as expected.
There is an interesting analogy between the case for which D ≥ b and the case, in Section 3.1, for which λ > r and initial wealth w ∈ [0, w * ). Indeed, by examining the above expression for W (t) with the one given in Remark 3.4, we see that we can get the former from the latter by replacing D and r with b and r + h, respectively. The hitting times of zero similarly correspond, as do the probabilities of dying before wealth reaches 0. In other words, we can get (3.24) from the first expression in (3.12) by replacing b and r + h with D and r, respectively. 
(3.25)
Proof. From the discussion in Remark 3.8, expected wealth at death is given bȳ
from which the expressions in (3.25) follow. (ii) Hypothesize that if w is "close enough" to the safe level hb r+h , then the individual will buy no additional insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. Inherent in this part of the ansatz is that D < rb r+h , so that the safe level equals w = hb r+h .
We will (slightly) abuse notation below by referring toφ as the solution of various boundary-value problems resulting from the above ansatz. However, as we progress, we will prove that theφ we thus obtain is indeed the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
rb r+h < D < b}: Based on part (a) of the ansatz, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest before ruining solves the following BVP: holds. The solution of (3.26) is given bȳ
(3.27)
In the next proposition, we show thatφ in (3.27) equals the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal. rb r+h < D < b}, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is given byφ in (3.27). The associated optimal insurance purchasing strategy is to buy additional insurance only when wealth reaches b−D, after which continually buy additional insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
Proof. We use Lemma 3.8 to prove this proposition. Becauseφ in (3.27) satisfies the BVP (3.26), we only need to show thatφ D ≤ 0 onR a . The inequalityφ D (w, D) ≤ 0 holds if and only if
which is equivalent to w + D ≥ b. Thus,φ in (3.27) is the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
Remark 3.10. For initial wealth and death benefit lying in the interior ofR a , optimally controlled wealth at time t equals
which decreases over time. Thus, wealth will never reach the safe level, and the first relevant hitting time is the time that wealth reaches b − D, τ b−D , which equals
After wealth reaches b − D, the individual continually buys life insurance to keep wealth plus death benefit equal to b. It follows from Remark 3.4, that at time t = τ b−D + s for s ≥ 0, optimally controlled wealth equals
which decreases over time. Thus, the second relevant hitting time is the hitting time of zero,
which we measure from time τ b−D . The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death of at least b equals the probability that she dies before time τ b−D plus the probability that she dies before time τ 0 given that she dies after time
which equals the expression in (3.27), as expected.
Corollary 3.12. For (w, D) ∈R a , expected wealth at death for an individual who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.11 is given bȳ
Proof. From the discussion in Remark 3.10, it follows that
from which the expressions in (3.28) follow.
Remark 3.11. For (w, D) ∈R a ,Ē in (3.28) uniquely solves the following BVP: The solution of (3.30) is given byφ
To obtain (3.31), we assume that rw − hD > 0 when w < hb r+h ; otherwise, if the line rw = hD is in the continuation region, the differential equation in (3.30) implies thatφ = 0 along rw = hD, which is not true. Also, in writing (3.31), we mean thatφ = 1 if w = hb r+h and D = rb r+h because that point is in the safe region.
Next, we find the boundary between the jump region underlying the expression in (3.29) and the continuation region underlying the expression in (3.31). It turns out that we can express this boundary as a function D = D j (w); subscript j for jump. We requireφ to be continuous along that boundary; that is, we require
Solving this equation for D j for 0 ≤ w < hb r+h yields We have, thus, shown thatφ in (3.35) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8, so we conclude thatφ is the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining. The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death equal to b is the probability that she dies after time τ hb r+h , or e . We have shown thatφ in (3.39) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8. Thus,φ is the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
There exist remarks and a corollary to Proposition 3.16 for the case λ > r that are parallel to those for λ < r, namely, Remarks 3.11 and 3.12 and Corollary 3.15. The only change is in definition of the regions on which the optimal behaviors of waiting and buying full insurance occur. In the interest of space, we omit those remarks and corollary.
That said, in the following theorem, we provide the reader with a summary of the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal without ruining for the problem in this section. Again, in the interest of space, we do not include the corresponding summary theory for expected wealth at death. For irreversible whole life insurance, the solution is more complicated, but if the initial death benefit is less than b − w, then we saw the same kind of optimal life insurance purchasing strategies there: if wealth is close enough to the safe level, then the individual will wait; if wealth is close enough to b − D, then the individual will buy so-called full insurance. It is interesting that if the individual in Section 3.2 has no life insurance initially, then her optimal insurance purchasing strategy is identical to the corresponding one in Section 3.1 (depending on λ versus r and her initial wealth) because the optimal life insurance purchasing strategies in Section 3.1 are non-decreasing.
In future work, we will consider various extensions of the set up in Section 3, in which the life insurance premium is payable continuously: (1) allow the force of mortality to change with time, as well as the cost of insurance; thus, for whole life insurance, the policy will develop a cash value; (2) maximize expected wealth at death, possibility limited by a given amount to prevent unrealistic life insurance purchasing strategies; and (3) assume that the individual also consumes from her wealth and wishes to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal without experiencing bankruptcy, possibly including life annuities in the financial market to cover some or all of her expenses. We anticipate that the solutions to these problems will be important because they will be directly applicable to financial planning.
